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To Boldly Go Where No Signatory Has
Gone Before: How the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 Has Rewritten the
United States' Obligations Under the
Geneva Conventions
Jason W. Hobbes*
I.

Introduction

"[T]he war against terrorism is a new kind of war.... In my
judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations
on questioning of enemy prisoners."' These were the words of Alberto
Gonzalez, then White House Counsel for the Bush Administration, in a
2002 memo to President Bush. This quotation encapsulates the
irreverent attitude that the Bush Administration has displayed towards
2
the Geneva Conventions, as well as the inherent difficulties facing the
United States in its quest to protect its citizens while remaining
compliant with international law.
The United States has long struggled with legal classification of
detainees and prisoners of war. Balancing the legal requirements of the

*J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2008.
1. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez, White House Counsel to George W.
Bush, President of the United States (Jan. 25, 2002), http://www.npr.org/documents/
2005/nov/torture/torturegonzales.pdf (last visited 10/16/2007) [hereinafter Memorandum
from Alberto Gonzalez].
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 7 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
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Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice 3
("UCMJ") with the competing needs of national security has proven to
be a difficult task. The Geneva Conventions deal largely with traditional
warfare and the problems that accompany it. Consequently, little
mention is made of those individuals classified by the United States as
"unlawful combatants" or "enemy combatants, ''4 such as members of Al
Qaeda.5
In recent years, non-traditional warfare, in the form of terrorism, has
become a much larger issue than conventional "open" warfare. As a
result, the interpretation and application of the Geneva Conventions in
the United States has been called into question.6
In Section II, this Comment explores the common-law foundation of
the classification and detention of prisoners of war ("POWs") and other
combatants, including the most significant of the recent United States
Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") decisions on the issue. Section III
discusses the various international treaties and conventions relevant to
classification of detainees. Section IV then analyzes how the treaties and
conventions discussed in Section III have been interpreted and legally
enacted in the United States, specifically through the Military
Commissions Act of 2006' ("MCA"). Finally, in Section V, this
Comment analyzes the reasoning of the Supreme Court cases construing
detainee classifications and contrasts them with the texts of the various
relevant international treaties and of the MCA.
Through this analysis, this Comment develops a framework for
understanding the roles that should be played by international treaties,
military tribunals, and United States' court decisions. The events of
September 11, 2001 have placed the United States in a difficult position
where it must balance the competing interests of civil liberties and
security from terrorist attacks. In addition, this Comment attempts to
illustrate the gravity and potentially dangerous consequences of
reinterpreting the United States' obligations under the Geneva
Conventions.

3. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950)
[hereinafter UCMJ].
4. Although the treatment of non-combatants was discussed briefly in the Geneva
Conventions III and IV, a comprehensive plan for trial and sentencing of the various
possible classifications of detainees has yet to be established. See generally Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 2; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 2.
5. See generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) [hereinafter Quirin].
6. See William Haynes, Enemy Combatants, Council on Foreign Relations (2002),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/5312/enemy-combatants.html (last visited 10/16/2007).
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
[hereinafter MCA].
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Common Law Background

The law of war, or the common law concerning acceptable practices
while engaged in war, is referred to as 'Jus in bello.' 8 It has developed
over time through treaties, and through common military practice, such
as the Nuremberg War Trials. 9 At the time of the Supreme Court's
decision in Ex Parte Quirin ("Quirin"),0 much of the law of war was
still truly "common" law based on traditional practices and treatises on
the subject." This common law provided a foundation for the Court's
decision in Quirin. 2 Today, in contrast, treaties such as the Geneva and
Hague Conventions and the United Nations Charter have codified much
of the law of war.
The United States Congress recently enacted the MCA, 13 which
defined the classifications of detainees and established the
constitutionality of and procedures for military commissions.
Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court laid the groundwork for this legislation
4
in cases such as Quirin.
A.

Ex Parte Quirin

Quirin clearly established the United States' interpretation of the
difference between detainees entitled to treatment as prisoners of war
("lawfil combatants"), 15 and detainees not entitled to such treatment
8. The other half of the law of war is called "jus ad bellum," and refers to
justifications for going to war. Condorelli & Naqvy, The War Against Terrorism andJus
in bello, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NoRMs AGAINST TERRORISM, 30-33 (Andrea

Bianchi ed., 2004); see also Changes to the Departmentof Defense Law of War Program,
Army Lawyer, 2006-AUG ARMy LAW. 23, 25.
9. See generallyTheodor Meron, From Nuremberg to The Hague, 149 MIL. L. REv.
107 (1995) [hereinafter Nuremberg to The Hague]; Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law
Comes ofAge, 92 AJIL 462 (1998) [hereinafter War Crimes Law].
10. Quirin,317U.S.at3l.
11. See generally Nuremberg to The Hague, supra note 10; see also War Crimes
Law, supra note 9.
12. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
13. See generally MCA, supra note 7.
14. See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. 1. It is worth noting that issues regarding habeas
corpus and congressional authority to establish tribunals were considered as early as 1866
in the case of Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). However, the ruling of the Supreme
Court was only that civilians could not be tried by tribunal in a jurisdiction where the
courts were still operating. See generally Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 40-46.
Moreover, this holding could easily be construed to apply only to certain classes of
lawful combatants.
15. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war
by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment
by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.
Id. at 31.
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("unlawful combatants" or "enemy belligerents").1 6 In support of this
distinction, the Supreme Court made repeated references to the "law of
war" and the "law of nations" throughout the case.' 7
As mentioned, when Quirin was decided during the 1940's, the law
of war was largely dictated by common law. The Second, Third, and
Fourth Geneva Conventions were still a few years away,' 8 and the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 left in place much of the common law of
war.1 9 Nevertheless, the common law already contained firmly
established and internationally recognized principles. One such principle
was the rule that combatants who do not wear "fixed and distinctive
emblems" are not entitled to treatment as prisoners of war. 20 The Court
recognized this and based its distinctions between types of detainees on
the idea that this standard was already firmly established, "[b]y universal
agreement and practice.'
Quirin involved a trial by military tribunal of eight men accused of
being German saboteurs who entered the United States covertly in June
of 1942.22 All eight men landed on the beaches of Long Island and
Florida carrying supplies of explosive devices while wearing complete or
partial German uniforms. 23 Immediately after landing, however, the men
buried their uniforms and proceeded to their destinations in Chicago and
New York in civilian clothing. All eight men were taken into custody
shortly thereafter in New York and Chicago by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.24
President Franklin D. Roosevelt ("Roosevelt") appointed a military
commission to try the men for offenses committed against the law of

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Geneva Conventions: The Core of International Humanitarian Law,
International Committee of the Red Cross (2004), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions (last visited 11/7/2007).
19. The Hague Convention of 1907, to which the United States was a signatory, had
outlined the basic definition of a "lawful belligerent" but had retained the common "law
of war," "[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued." Quirin, 317
U.S. at 35.
20. Our Government, by thus defining lawful belligerents entitled to be treated
as prisoners of war, has recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents
not entitled to that privilege, including those who though combatants do not
wear "fixed and distinctive emblems." And by Article 15 of the Articles of
War Congress has made provision for their trial and punishment by military
commission, according to "the law of war."
Id.
21. Id.at 30.
22. Id. at 22.
23. "[A]n officer of the German High Command.., had instructed them to wear
their German uniforms while landing in the United States." Id. at 23.
24. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22.
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war. 25 Roosevelt also issued a proclamation authorizing trial by military
tribunal for similar offenders. 6 Roosevelt's proclamation specified that
persons captured entering the United States with the intention of causing
harm to its people or property were not entitled to the protection of the
United States court system. 7
After trial and sentencing by the tribunal, all eight men filed
petitions for habeas corpus with the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.28 They argued the President was without authority to order
trial by military tribunal.29
The District Court denied these motions and the men subsequently
filed motions for leave to file petitions of habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court.30 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,and affirmed
the order of the District Court denying the petitions.3 1
In its decision, the Court established that the President did have the
authority to order certain offenses tried before military commissions.
The Court concluded that at least one of the charges against the detainees
"alleged an offense which the President is authorized to order tried by
military commission." 32 The Court further concluded that Roosevelt's
order establishing the commission itself was lawful and that the
authorization and makeup of the commission were also constitutional
and lawful.33 The President derived this authority from Article 15 of the
Articles of War,34 which gave the President the power to enforce the

25.

The proclamation reads, in part:

All persons who are subjects, citizens, or residents of any Nation at war
with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the
direction of any such Nation and who during time of war enter or
attempt to enter the United States or any territory or possession thereof,
through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing
or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or
warlike acts, or violations of the law or war, shall be subject to the law
of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such
persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy ...in the courts of
the United States.
7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942), available at
Proclamation 2561,
[hereinafter Proclamation
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 16281
2561].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 48.
33. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
34. The Articles of War was the legislative predecessor to the current UCMJ, which
was enacted on May 31, 1951. See UCMJ, supra note 3.
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Articles of War,35 as well as the law of war, through the creation of such
commissions.3 6

B.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

37

The next significant development in judge-made law interpreting
the United States' legal classifications of detainees came some fifty years
after Quirin with the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ("Hamdi"). This case
arrived in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks of September 11,
2001. In this post-9/1 1 era, classification of detainees and the law of war
grew dramatically in importance and media coverage. The increased
media coverage of and interest in terrorism and detainees in the war on
terror naturally served to increase public consciousness about these
issues. As these issues grew in coverage and importance, they became
more divisive, resulting in a great deal of politicizing by the two primary
political parties.
In Hamdi, Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of the Court,
recognized that the executive branch had the power to detain enemy
combatants subject to very limited due process rights.38 This power,
however, did not extend to United States citizens.39
The Hamdi case concerned a young man (Hamdi) captured in
Afghanistan in late 2001. The United States Government alleged that
Hamdi had been fighting alongside the Taliban, and detained him at
Guantanamo Bay.4 ° Shortly after his capture, it was discovered that
35. Regarding the authority of the president to enact military commissions, the Court
said: "[W]e think it must be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized
by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War." Quirin, 317 U.S.
at 35-36. It is important here to note that Article 15 of the Articles of War has been
replaced with the "substantially identical" Article 21 of the UCMJ. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 (2006) [hereinafter Hamdan].
36. The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial
shall not be construed as depriving military commissions.., or other military
tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-32, (quoting 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593).
37. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) [hereinafter Hamdi].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 511-12. Guantanamo Bay is a United States naval base located on the
island of Cuba. The Guantanamo Bay detainment camp, located on a portion of the naval
base, was created in 2002 and is operated by Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Afghan
Prisoners Going to Gray Area: Military Unsure What Follows Transfer to U.S. Base in
Cuba, WASHINGTON POST, January 9, 2002. In addition to controversy over allegations
of torture taking place in the camp since its creation in 2002, a legal firestorm has raged
over whether detainees located in the camp are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States, since it is technically located within the territory of Cuba, a sovereign
nation. Although the Supreme Court determined that detainees held at Guantanamo did
have access to U.S. courts in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), this determination has
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Hamdi was a United States citizen. Still, the Bush Administration
argued that Hamdi's actions in Afghanistan made him an "enemy
combatant., 4 1 Consequently, the Administration asserted that he was not
entitled to access to the United States court system.42
Hamdi's father filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Eastern
District of Virginia.4 3 He claimed that Hamdi's detention, without access
to
legal counsel
or notice
any charges
pending against
him, 44 was
violation
of the Fourth
and of
Fourteenth
Amendments
of the United
Statesa
Constitution. 4
Justice O'Connor's opinion stated that the President had the
authority to detain enemy combatants pursuant to the Authorization for
Use of Military Force ("AUMF"). 46 The AUMF stated, in relevant part,
"the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 ."4

The Court accordingly found that the detention

of Hamdi as an enemy combatant was lawful under this act.48
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor asserted that Hamdi's status as a United
States citizen entitled him to basic due process rights including the right
to counsel and the right to notice of the charges against him.4 9
C. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 5°
The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ("Hamdan"), decided in the
summer of 2006, clarified the classification and treatment of unlawful
combatants.
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court found that the President had
overstepped his bounds by creating military commissions to try unlawful
combatants without congressional authorization.5 ' Furthermore, the
Court held that the military commissions at issue were not mentioned in

been called into question by the MCA.
41. Id.
42. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511-12.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
46. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511-12; Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) [hereinafter A UMF].
47. Id.
48. "[W]e agree with the Government's alternative position, that Congress has in
fact authorized Hamdi's detention, through the AUMF." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.
49. Id. at511-12.
50. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
51. Id. at 2775-76.
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the AUMF 52 or the Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA") 53 and,
consequently, were not authorized. This decision affirmed the relevance
of the UCMJ, the Geneva Conventions, and the law of war in general and
effectively limited the war power of the executive branch.
In November of 2001, Afghan forces captured Hamdan (a Yemeni
citizen) in Afghanistan.54 He was subsequently turned over to the United
States military and transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2002, where he
was detained as an enemy combatant. 55 Over two years later, Hamdan
was finally charged by the United States Government 56
with conspiracy
commission."
military
by
triable
...
offenses
"to commit
Hamdan filed petitions for habeas corpus and mandamus,57 arguing
that the President was without the requisite authority to establish military
commissions such as the one before which he was tried.58 Hamdan based
his argument on the grounds that military commissions were not
authorized by either the AUMF 59 or the law of war to try the crime of
conspiracy. In addition, Hamdan argued that conspiracy was not actually
a violation of the law of war. 60 Finally, Hamdan contended that the
military commission at issue did not offer the safeguards guaranteed to
him by international law, such as the right to hear the charges against
him, see the evidence against him, and challenge the witnesses presented
against him.6 1
The Court of Appeals dismissed Hamdan's petition on three
52. See generally A UMF, supra note 46.
53. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2776; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109148 § 1001, 119 Stat. 2739 [hereinafter DTA].
54. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2759. This charge is particularly interesting in light of the fact that it
appears to be nothing more than a truism intended to guarantee a trial before a military
commission.
57. A petition for mandamus is a document filed with a court requesting that court to
order a public official to perform a certain action, believed by the petitioner to be within
the scope of the official's duties. A petition for habeas corpus (Latin for "you should
have the body") is a legal document filed with a court that requests relief from
imprisonment by a detainee believing himself to be held unlawfully. ERIc M. FREEDMAN,
HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY, (NYU Press) (2001).
Notably, the right of a detainee classified as an "unlawful combatant" to file a petition for
habeas corpus has been eliminated by the MCA of 2006. See Section III infra for more
information.
58. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. Hamdan did not challenge his status as an enemy
combatant, perhaps because of the broad definition used by the government, defining the
term as, "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners." Id. at 2761.
59. See generallyAUMF, supra note 46.
60. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759-61.
61. Id.at2759.
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independent grounds: (1) the Geneva Conventions were not judicially
enforceable; (2) even if they were, Hamdan was not entitled to their
protections; and (3) even if he was entitled to their protections,
abstention was appropriate.6 2
Relying in part on Quirin, Justice Stevens found that habeas corpus
was available to Hamdan in spite of language in the DTA that the Court
found inapplicable. The government argued unsuccessfully that the DTA
63
had stripped United States courts of jurisdiction to hear such petitions.
The Court declined to rule on whether petitions for habeas corpus were
still available to enemy combatants, 64 finding merely that the DTA was
not retroactive. 65
Justice Stevens proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the
military commission convened to try Hamdan.6 6 The Court found that
the military commission convened to try Hamdan was not authorized by
any congressional act 67 and that the commission violated the UCMJ and
the Geneva Conventions.6 8
The Court held that neither the AUMF nor the DTA contain a
specific provision authorizing the creation of military commissions, nor
was this authority implied in either of the legislative acts. 69 The Court
also scorned, without elaboration, the "controversial" decision by the
Court in Quirin to rely on Article 15 of the Articles of War for
authorization of military commissions. 7 °
Justice Stevens further discussed the three primary roles of military
commissions under the traditional law of war, which are to:
(1) substitute for civilian courts when martial law has been declared,
(2) try civilians in occupied territory under temporary military rule, and
(3) convene "incident to the conduct of war" in order to try those who
have violated the law of war.71 Justice Stevens pointed out that the third
role of military commissions is primarily a fact-finding role. Only the

62. Id. at 2794.
63. Id. at 2766-69.
64. This abstention may increase in importance in light of the MCA, which
specifically eliminated the right of habeas corpus to those classified as unlawful
combatants, should the Supreme Court choose to rule on the issue. See generally MCA,
supra note 7.
65. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2765.
66. Id. at 2776-78.
67. Id.
68. See generally id. at 2749.
69. Id. at 2775-76.
70. "We have no occasion to revisit Quirin's controversial characterization of
Article of War 15 as congressional authorization for military commissions." Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. at 2775.
71. Id. at 2776.
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72
decision in Quirin has implicated this fact-finding role in modem times.
The military commission that tried Hamdan was established in order to
fulfill this third role but had overstepped its bounds. Justice Stevens
explained that, "Quirin represents the high-water mark of military power
to try enemy combatants for war crimes. 73 This statement, and others
throughout the opinion, implied that the Court was uncomfortable with
the use of military commissions in this case.
With regard to the procedures used by the military commission, the
Court quoted Article 36 of the UCMJ. 7 4 Article 36 states that the
President, though free within the boundaries of the UCMJ to prescribe
regulations for the procedures of military commissions, is still bound by
the UCMJ and no commissions may violate its rules.75
Hamdan argued that the military commissions' practices of refusing
to allow detainees to view the evidence against them and holding
proceedings to which detainees are not admitted, violate UCMJ Article
36.76 Without drawing any bright-line rule, the Court agreed with
Hamdan that the military commissions at issue had overstepped the
President's flexible but limited authority to set procedures for trial by
military commission.7 7
Finally, Hamdan argued that the procedures used by the military
78
Partially
commission also violated the Geneva Conventions.
dismissing the government's claim that the Geneva Conventions were
inapplicable in that Al Qaeda is not a signatory to the Conventions, the
Court concluded that certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions
nevertheless apply:

There is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that
applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between
signatories... . One such provision prohibits "the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all
which are recognized as indispensable by
the judicial guarantees
79
civilized peoples."

72. Id. at 2777.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2791.
75. [P]rocedure... may be prescribed by the president by regulations which
shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the
rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases.., but
which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791.
76. Id. at 2791.
77. Id. at 2792.
78. Id. at 2775-76.
79. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
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The Court found that this provision alone required reversal of the case.
Justice Stevens reasoned that, "the procedures adopted to try Hamdan...
deviate from those governing courts-martial in ways not justified.., and
for that reason ...fail to afford the requisite guarantees." 80 Justice
Stevens went on to explain that the procedures employed by the
commissions must 'comply
with the UCMJ and the "rules and precepts of
81
the law of nations.
The most flagrant violation by the commissions, according to the
Court in Hamdan, was the exclusion of the accused detainee from the
proceedings.82 "Commission Order No. 1" permits the government to
exclude the accused detainee and his civilian counsel from "ever 83learning
what evidence was presented during any part of the proceeding."
In further violation of the rights of the accused, any evidence was
admissible at hearings before these commissions if it would have
"probative value to a reasonable person." 84 Hearsay and other
impermissible testimony, even when obtained through torture, would be
admitted into evidence in order for the government to obtain its
conviction.
The Court also concluded that the conflict with Al Qaeda fell within
the ambit of Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions. 85 Common
Article III provides limited protections to non-signatories involved in
conflicts that are "not international in scope. ' 86 However, the Court
ruled that Common Article III should be read as broadly as possible; the
conflict with Al Qaeda was "not international in scope" because Al
Qaeda was neither a nation-state nor a signatory to the Geneva
Conventions.8 7
III. Applicable International Conventions
The Geneva Conventions are composed of four separate treaties,
drafted in Geneva, Switzerland between 1864 and 1949.88 These treaties
have been amended by three additional "protocols," added from 1977

80. Id. at 2798.
81. In perhaps the strongest statement in the opinion against the procedures
employed by the commission, the Court wrote: "The procedures that the Government has
decreed will govern Hamdan's trial by commission violate these laws." Id. at 2787.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84.

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2787.

85. Id. at 2796.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. A Brief History of the Laws of War, Society of Professional Journalists (2003),
http://www.genevaconventions.org/ (last visited 10/16/2007) [hereinafter Brief History of
the Laws of War].
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through 2005.89 Each of the four Geneva Conventions contains so-called

Common Articles I, II, and 111.90 These articles are called "common"
because they are in-fact common to all four Geneva Conventions. These
govern the duty of the signatories 9' to enforce the conventions (Common
Article I), the scope of the conventions (Common Article II), and
minimum provisions that each signatory must provide to all persons
within a signatory's territory in any conflict "not of an international
character" (Common Article 11I).92
The recent controversies 93 regarding interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions have largely surrounded Common Article III of the Geneva
Conventions and Article IV of the Third Geneva Convention.9 4
Common Article III contains a number of minimum provisions to be
applied in times of war. One of the most significant of these minimum
provisions is the clause prohibiting, "the passing of sentences ...without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples., 95 This provision is applicable only to certain
specified persons, including "members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms. ,,96 Italso applies only to conflicts "of an international
character., 97 The interpretation of these criteria has been a subject of
vigorous debate because it determines which guarantees and rights must
89. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 86(2) (1979) [hereinafter Protocol1]; Protocol II Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (June 8, 1977), 26 I.L.M. 561, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II]; Protocol III Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August, 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8,
2005, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/615, (last visited 10/16/2007) [hereinafter
Protocol III]; see also Brief History of the Laws of War, supra note 88.
90. First,Second, Third, & Fourth Geneva Conventions, supra note 2.
91. A signatory is a nation-state that chooses to literally sign a treaty, thereby
becoming bound by its provisions. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332 (dated May 23, 1969 and entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
92. See generally Brief History of the Laws of War, supra note 88.
93. Lionel Beehner, The Geneva Convention Debate, Council on Foreign Relations
(last
(2006),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/1 1469/genevaconventiondebate.html
visited 10/16/2007); We Don't Care about International Law, FOIA Centre (2006),
http://www.foiacentre.com/newsgbay060304_03.html (last visited 10/16/2007); Joseph P.
Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful CombatantDetainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and
the InternationalLaws ofArmed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REv. 1, 30-34 (2004).
94. Lionel Beehner, The United States and the Geneva Conventions, Council on
Foreign Relations (2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/1 1485/ (last visited
10/16/2007); see generally Geneva Convention III, supra note 3.
95. See generallyThird Geneva Convention, supra note 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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be provided to detainees or unlawful combatants.
Article IV of the Third Geneva Convention, defining a "prisoner of
war," 98 has been interpreted by the Bush Administration not to include
"unlawful combatants" captured in the "war on terror." 99 As mentioned
above in Part I, the term "unlawful combatant" was coined in the 1940's
around the time of Quirin, but was never used in the Geneva
Conventions.
Article V of the Third Geneva Convention states in part that those
who fall into the hands of an enemy after committing a "belligerent act"
should be extended certain minimum protections where doubt exists as to
their legal status. 00° Further, the Convention states that, "such persons
shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal."101 These
provisions establish that detainees must be treated as prisoners of war, at
least until a "competent tribunal" determines they do not satisfy the
definition of a prisoner of war.
IV. Domestic Enactment of International Obligations Under the Geneva
Conventions
Shortly after the decision in Hamdan, several sources reported that
the Bush Administration was considering amending domestic law to
reinterpret the United States' obligations under Common Article III of
the Geneva Conventions.10 2 The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan,
discussed in Part I, held that current procedures used by the military
commissions were in violation of the Geneva Conventions. 103 Although

98. The definition of someone entitled to be treated as a "prisoner of war" under the
Third Geneva Convention, was interpreted by the Bush Administration in 2003 to be
determined by the satisfaction of four conditions:

They would have to be part of a military hierarchy; they would have to
worn uniforms or other distinctive signs visible at a distance; they would
to have carried arms openly; and they would have to have conducted
military operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement by

have
have
their
the Press

Secretary on the Geneva Convention, May 7, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html (last visited 10/16/2007) [hereinafter Statement on
the Geneva Convention].
99. Statement on the Geneva Convention, supra note 98; see generally Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 2.
100. Third Geneva Convention, Art. V, supranote 2.
101. Id.
102. R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce Threat of
Prosecution,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
August
9, 2006,
available at

http://www.truthout.org/docs.2006/0809060.shtml [hereinafter Threat of Prosecution].
103. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2796, (quoting Geneva Convention III, supra note 2);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." The Legal Academy Goes To Practice, 120 HARV. L. REv. 65,
(2006) [hereinafter Legal Academy].
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the Court did not comprehensively review the procedures used by the
commissions, it held that the provisions of
Common Article III applied to
10 4
territory.
States
United
on
held
detainees
The decision in Hamdan made it clear that the military commissions
at issue would have to allow detainees access to their hearings, permit
them to view the evidence against them, and probably limit the
admission of hearsay evidence in order to be constitutional. 10 5 The Bush
Administration believed that the concessions required by the Court
would compromise
national security and thus began to find a way around
10 6
standards.
these
In the fall of 2006, Congress passed the MCA
in an attempt to
07
answer the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan.'
The purpose of the act was to "authorize trial by military
commission for violations of the law of war."' 1 8 Within this broad
framework, Congress also established a clear definition of "unlawful
combatant," and eliminated both the right of habeas corpus for alien
unlawful combatants, 10 9 and any potential causes of action arising under
the Geneva Conventions brought by unlawful combatants. " 0
The MCA allows unlawful combatants"' to be tried, as before
Hamdan, with virtually no legal safeguards. 1 2 Unlawful combatants
may find themselves facing vague charges such as "conspiracy to
commit crimes triable by military commission," and unable to view the
evidence supporting these charges. 1 3 Even where the evidence is
104.
105.
106.
107.

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
Id.
Threat of Prosecution,supra note 102.
Warren Richey, Will the Supreme Court Shackle New Tribunal Law?, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1017/
p01 s02-usju.html (last visited 10/16/2007) [hereinafter New TribunalLaw].
108. MCA, supra note 7, at 2602.
109. On the issue of the suspension of habeas corpus, there are several strong
arguments against the constitutionality of the MCA based on its elimination of the right
of habeas corpus for those determined to be unlawful combatants, possibly in violation of
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. "The privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see Karen
DeYoung, Court Told It Lacks Power in Detainee Cases, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct.

20, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/
19/AR2006101901692.html?nav-rss nation/special.
110. See generally Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
111. Whether the MCA applies only to unlawful enemy combatants is a question that
has not yet been decided.
William Glaberson, Judge Throws Out Charges in
GuantanamoPrison Case, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 4, 2007.

112. "The [MCA] rules permit the exclusion of a defendant from his trial if classified
evidence is being presented, and the admission of hearsay and coerced statements as
evidence." New TribunalLaw, supra note 107.
113. Id.
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brought to light, hearsay evidence is admissible and the mere written
notes of an interrogator can result in a conviction, which is obtained by a
two-thirds vote of the commission. 14 These rules nearly eliminate any
legal rights or safeguards that may have been possessed by unlawful
combatants under the Geneva Conventions.
In addition to removing the petition of habeas corpus from the legal
arsenal of any detainee determined to be an unlawful combatant, the
MCA also prohibits detainees awaiting legal classification from filing
such a petition.11 5 This effectively gives the President the power to
detain individuals indefinitely without charging them with any specific
crime or offering them any legal recourse to challenge their detention.
The MCA was presented as a limitation and prohibition of torture
by the military or government interrogators. While it is true that the
MCA specifically limits the forms of interrogation or coercion that may
be used against detainees, it also goes a long way towards eliminating
liability of government actors for war crimes or torture committed
against unlawful combatants.1 16
V.

Analysis of the Concerns Regarding the Military Commissions Act
of 2006

Congress and President Bush have redefined the obligations of the
1 17
United States under the Geneva Conventions through these changes.
This "re-writing" is not unconstitutional in and of itself, but it presents
numerous issues regarding foreign policy and separation of powers
among the Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Branches.
The language of the MCA explicitly acknowledges the authority of
the President to interpret the nation's obligations under the Geneva
Conventions. 118 This Comment does not question the existence of the
constitutional authority of the President to interpret and enforce the
provisions of an international treaty through appropriate legislation.
Rather, this Comment questions the long-term consequences of this
interpretation of international law and foreign policy, and whether the
MCA is, as it claims, actually beyond the reach of the Supreme Court.

114. MCA, supra note 7, at 2610-14.
115. Id. at 2636.
116. Joanne Mariner, The CIA, the MCA, and Detainee Abuse, FindLaw, Nov. 08,
2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20061108.html (last visited 10/16/2007).
117. Specifically, the MCA and Patriot Act.
118. [T]he President has the authority for the United States to interpret the
meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher
standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations
which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
MCA, supra note 7.
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Separation of Powers Concerns

The authority of the President, with the concurrence of two-thirds of
the Senate, to make treaties is grounded in the Constitution." 9 Congress'
power to enact legislation enforcing those treaties is similarly expressly
permitted by the Constitution.12 0 This power has been exercised through
the MCA.
In order to avoid the inconvenient standards of Common Article III
while 3taying technically within the boundaries of international law, the
MCA employs blatant circular reasoning. The MCA accomplishes this
by defining itself as a "constitutionally authorized interpretation of a
treaty" 121 that does not produce any grave violations of the Geneva
Conventions. 122 Further, the commission unashamedly defines the very
commissions it authorizes to be "regularly constituted courts" offering
' 12 3
the same judicial guarantees "indispensable to civilized peoples.
Congress included self-legitimizing provisions in its legislation instead
of provisions that are objectively compliant with internationallypracticed norms.
Although treaty interpretation is a necessary and regular part of
domestic enforcement of international treaties, it is not meant to be a
legislative free-for-all. 124 By allowing breaches of treaties so long as
they are not considered "grave," 125 (presumably a subjective standard
judged by the breaching signatory)
the United States has entered into
126
unknown and dangerous territory.
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
120. Id. at art. I, § 1,8 cl. 8,10,14,17.
121. As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the President has the
authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the
Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative
regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions.
MCA, supra note 7, at 2632.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2602.
124. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 92.
125. Section 6 of the MCA, "Implementation of Treaty Obligations," states that the
MCA:
fully satisflies] the obligation under Article 129 of the Third Geneva
Convention for the United States to provide effective penal sanctions for grave
breaches which are encompassed in common Article 3 in the context of an
armed conflict not of an international character.
MCA, supra note 7, at 2632.
126. Although some argue that reciprocity in terms of international humanitarian law
is not necessary against terrorist actors. See Steven Ratner, Rethinking the Geneva
Conventions, Crimes
of
War
(2003),
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/
genevaConventions/gc-ratner.html (last visited 10/16/2007). This argument goes against
basic principles in U.S. constitutional history (the Declaration of Independence's
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, though drafted in
1969 and non-retroactive, specifically allows signatories to pass
"reservations " 27 to treaties at the time of ratification. This provides an
argument, however attenuated, for at least the structural international
legality of legislation such as the MCA, if not for its substantive
provisions.
Although criticisms to this effect have been raised,1 28 the Bush
Administration has glossed over fears of negative long-term
consequences to the MCA's provisions, choosing instead to reemphasize the importance of national security in light of the terrorist
threats facing our nation. In President Bush's own words, "The Military
Commissions Act of 2006 will allow the continuation of a CIA program
that has been one of America's most potent tools in fighting the War on
129
Terror."
Despite the language in the MCA defining itself as constitutional,

the Supreme Court has recently reasserted the principle that it is the
"province and duty" of the Supreme Court to interpret the United States'
obligations under the treaties to which it is a signatory. 30 This indicates
that, although the President and Congress may sign treaties and enact
legislation enforcing them or interpreting them, the final say remains
131
within the purview of the Supreme Court.
With regard to congressional implication in the MCA that the
Geneva Conventions are both good law and above judicial interpretation,

"inalienable rights") and Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions (rights and
standards "indispensable" to "civilized peoples").
127. Treaty "reservations" are essentially written amendments to the ratification of a
treaty excluding or reserving certain portions of the treaty. Signatories may only pass
reservations to non-essential portions of a treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra note 92.
128. Senator John McCain has been a vocal opponent to any use of torture by the
United States military, emphasizing that it can only have negative long-term
consequences in terms of reprisals against the United States and its soldiers. McCain,
however, eventually supported the MCA and focused on its limitations on potential uses
of force in interrogation. Surprisingly, this support came despite the failure of an
amendment (S.A. 5088) by Senator Ted Kennedy which would have outlawed the use of
waterboarding, a form of very controversial coercion/interrogation. Statement of Senator
John McCain, On the Military Commissions Act, S.3930, September 28, 2006; see also,
Carlos Vazquez, Hamdan and the Geneva Conventions, Georgetown Law Faculty Blog
(2006),
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown-universitylaw/2006/06/
hamdan and -the.. html (last visited 10/16/2007) [hereinafter Vazquez Blog].
129. Statement by President Bush, White House Press Office, Office of the Press
Secretary (Sept. 28,
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/
20060928-15.html (last visited 11/7/2007).
130. Vazquez Blog, supra note 129, (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct.
2669 (2006)).
131. On June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari in two
cases challenging the MCA. These cases will be heard sometime during the term
beginning in October, 2007. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S.Ct. 3078 (2007).
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one writer argues, "[f]or a statute that purports to protect the courts'
Article III judicial power but deny courts the authority to look at all the
law before them challenges one of the fundamental tenets of Marbury v.
Madison itself."' 32
This quote recognizes the logical breakdown
internalized in the MCA's attempt to avoid Supreme Court review in
possible contravention
of the firmly established principles of Marbury v.
33
Madison.1
B.

InternationalLaw/Norms Concerns

To the extent that the MCA is a re-interpretation of the United
States' obligations under the Geneva Conventions, it is presumptively
constitutional. 34 Nevertheless, the wisdom of interpreting the Geneva
Conventions so as to limit the substantive rights granted by those treaties
is questionable at best. Through this legislation, Congress and the
President have interpreted the Geneva Conventions in a manner that
effectively defines its substantive provisions (at least as applied to
unlawful combatants) into obsolescence.
The Supreme Court in Hamdan implied that the practices of the
military tribunals were in violation of Common Article III of the Geneva
Conventions. 135 This implication was based in part on substantive
violations. For instance, military tribunals are used instead of "regularly
constituted court[s]," which provide judicial guarantees recognized as
' 36
"indispensable by civilized peoples."'
Justice Stevens in Hamdan rejected the Bush Administration's
argument that Common Article III did not apply to all detainees because
the conflict with al Qaeda was not a conflict of an "international
character."' 37 Consequently, all detainees captured pursuant to this
conflict were entitled to the minimum protections provided by Common
Article 111.138 Congress, in the MCA, explicitly rejected the minimum

132. Deborah N. Pearlstein, Saying What the Law Is, 1 HARV. L. POL'Y REV (online)
(Nov 6, 2006), http://www.hlpronline.com (last visited 10/16/2007).
133. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
134. As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the President has the
authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the
Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative
regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions.
MCA, supra note 7, at 2632 (This assumption puts aside questions of executive or
congressional aggrandizement of federal judicial authority, as considered in Subsection A
above.).
135. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2796.
136. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2.
137. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2796.
138. Id.
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protections offered by Common Article III.139 It will be interesting to see
whether the Supreme Court chooses to press the issue, or defer to
Congressional judgment.
Not wishing to be confined by standards recognized as
"indispensable by civilized peoples," 140 the Bush Administration worked
with Congress to pass the MCA. This was an attempt not only to comply
with the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan regarding authorization of
military commissions, but
also to subvert the effect of the decision with
141
regard to detainee rights.
As a result of this interpretation, the definition of "unlawful
combatants" has been completely removed from the protections of the
Geneva Conventions.1 42 The Geneva Conventions are not relevant
43
because they no longer hold any real rights for most detainees.
Standards once found by the United States to be "indispensable to
civilized peoples" have been easily and conveniently discarded. The
President now has final authority to define "unlawful combatant,"
and
144
determine what rights that individual will or will not receive.
One of the most interesting, and perhaps far-reaching, changes
brought about by the MCA is the elimination of any cause of action or
right for detainees arising under the Geneva Conventions. The provision
establishing this reads, "[n]o alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to
trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva

139.
140.

MCA, supra note 7, at 2602.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2.

141. See generally Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
142. MCA, supra note 7, at 2601.
143. Id. at 2602.
144. Alison Nathan of Fordham University School of Law expressed a very strong
response to the MCA in a recent article.

Pursuant to the habeas-stripping provision, any non-U.S. citizen who has been
or will be swept up by the military, the CIA, or our allies and transferred to a
secret black-site or Guantanamo Bay, or rendered to another country where
they are held and interrogated at the behest of the U.S. government, may no
longer have any recourse to a U.S. court. As a result, the administration will
have no obligation to put forward to an independent branch of government even
a minimal explanation of the basis for a potentially indefinite detention. Nor
will there exist any mechanism to check military or CIA abuses, including
torture, of detainees. Whatever rights to humane treatment under the Geneva
Conventions that remain following the "compromise" between the White
House and the Republican Senators (and there is serious question as to whether
this was indeed a compromise or a capitulation to the White House) will be
meaningless since the habeas-stripping provision unquestionably ensures that
those rights will find no day in court and no remedy.
Alison Nathan, History Starts Today: the Perils of Habeas-Stripping,Jurist Legal News
& Research (2006), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/09/history-starts-today-perils-

of-habeas.php (last visited 10/16/2007).
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' 45
Conventions as a source of rights.'
The MCA clearly established that there are no individual causes of
action under the Geneva Conventions. Not even the Supreme Court in
Hamdan disputed this conclusion. 46 However, these treaties are still
binding upon all signatories. As the Court explained, "[t]he question
whether the Conventions are judicially enforceable is
quite separate from
47
binding."
are
Conventions
the
whether
the question

VI. Conclusion
The events of September 11, 2001 placed a tremendous amount of
pressure on President Bush and Congress to secure American citizens
against future acts of terrorism. As Niccolo Machiavelli pointed out long
ago 148 (and Benjamin Franklin warned), 149 people willingly sacrifice
liberty in exchange for increased security in times of danger.
Machiavelli understood that people often confuse liberty and
security, and are thus willing to exchange the one for the other.' 50
Consequently, in times of war or insecurity, a leader can aggrandize his
or her authority by offering the citizens increased security from harm in
exchange for various liberties.
It is an established phenomenon (or more aptly put, construct of
social behavior) that people are willing to accept restraints upon
freedoms in times of great danger. The internment of JapaneseAmericans during World War II provides a modem example. Although
the idea of locking up 110,000 men, women, and children because of
their ethnicity' 5 ' would seem absurd to nearly everyone in the United
States today, it was quite widely accepted in 1942, and even upheld by
52
the Supreme Court in cases such as Korematsu v. United States.
Although there are obvious differences in scale and application between
the Japanese-American internment program and treatment of detainees
under the MCA, the motivating principle behind the legislation remains
145. MCA, supranote 7, at 2602.
146. See generally Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
147. Vazquez Blog, supra note 129.
148. Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, in The Chief Works and Others, (A.
Gilbert trans., Duke University Press) (1965) [hereinafter Discourses on Livy]; Niccolo
Machiavelli, The Prince, (Q. Skinner and R. Price eds., Cambridge University Press)
(1988) [hereinafter The Prince].
149. With his famous quote, "those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a
little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." This statement is generally
attributed to Benjamin Franklin, and was used in the title of the work, AN HISTORICAL
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759).

150. See generally Discourseson Livy, supra note 148; The Prince,supra note 148.
151. Summary of Korematsu v. United States, availableat http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/
infousa/facts/democrac/65.htm (last visited 10/16/2007).
152. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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the same.
The idea of exchanging liberty for security helps to understand how
legislation such as the Patriot Act' 53 and the MCA have been passed by
54
Congress and, for the most part, accepted by the American people.1
The collapse of the World Trade Center towers and the deaths of nearly
3,000 American citizens on September 11, 2001 had a strong
psychological impact on the nation, as "predicted" by Machiavelli. After
9/11, most people were willing to allow the FBI to search library
records' 55 or allow Congress to eliminate the right of habeas corpus from
those who the President deems dangerous enough to receive the title
"unlawful combatant."'' 56
Increased security may be purchased at the cost of civil liberty, but
a balance must be found between the two. Of what worth is increased
security from terrorist attacks if we must give up, or refuse to offer to
others, the liberties (the standards recognized as "indispensable to
civilized peoples") we enjoy? Some may argue that liberties are of little
value if we are not alive to enjoy them. Nevertheless, no person and no
combatant, lawful or unlawful, should be denied the principles and rights
that Americans hold dear and that are espoused in the Geneva
Conventions based upon any technicality or legal classification.

153. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 [hereinafter Patriot

Act].
154. The Patriot Act was the first in a series of laws passed under the Bush
Administration after September 11, 2001 that significantly reduced civil liberties in
exchange for security against terrorism. (Further substantive information regarding the
Patriot Act is beyond the scope of this comment, but is available at the Library of
Congress site shown). To further illustrate its widespread acceptance, the Act was passed
in the Senate by a vote of 98 to 1, and in the House by a vote of 357 to 66. Library of
Congress, H.R. 3162 Vote Summary, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d 107:HRO3162:@@@L&summ2-m& [hereinafter H.R. 3162 Vote Summary].
155. This is in regard to a provision of the Patriot Act that, though not directed
specifically at libraries, allows the FBI to order the production by a third person of books
and records. H.R. 3162, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title II, Sec. 215.
156. MCA, supra note 7, at 2636.

